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FOREMOST INSURANCE CO. v. RICHARDSON: IF
THIS IS WATER, IT MUST BE ADMIRALTY -
Phyllis D. Camilla*
Michael P. Drzal**
I. INTRODUCTION
A sleepy, moss-draped Louisiana bayou, on which two families en-
joyed Sunday afternoon leisure, hardly seems the stuff of which federal
cases, let alone Supreme Court decisions, are made. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court recently used precisely that setting as a springboard for at-
tempting, once again, to delineate the parameters of admiralty tort juris-
diction.
Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson' involved what would be, in a
land context, a routine vehicular collision. One vehicle was a small boat
used for noncommercial fishing; the other, equally small, was pulling a
water skier on a zip sled. The two collided. 2 Because the collision oc-
curred on water, the Supreme Court decided that the issues of tort liability
arising from the collision should be litigated in federal district court.3
In so deciding, the Court extended admiralty jurisdiction to "the edge
of absurdity."4 The decision creates an unnecessary burden on the federal
court system, ignores the states' interest in litigating the issues of local
torts in their own courts, and, most importantly, fails to react to long-.
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chant Marine Safety; J.D., George Washington University, 1983.
** Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Coast Guard; Staff Attorney, U.S. Coast Guard Maritime and
International Law Division, Office of the Chief Counsel; J.D., Georgetown University, 1979.
The opinions and assertions contained in this article are those of the authors and are not to be
construed as official or reflecting those of the Commandant or the Coast Guard at large.
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On August 26, 1983, President Reagan signed into law Pub. L. No. 98-89, the title 46 codification
bill. This bill repealed and replaced all the marine safety statutes administered by the Coast Guard
with the exception of loadline measurement provisions, and enacted as positive law subtitle II of title
46 of the United States Code. All references in this article to affected sections of title 46 are cited to
the recodified version. Because this recodification was not in effect at the time of the Richardson
decision, references to the section numbers in effect at that time are also included in every citation.
No session law citation is currently available for Pub. L. No. 98-89. Citations in this article are based
on the version appearing in H.R. REP. No. 338, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review).
I. 457U.S. 668 (1982).
2. Id. at 669-70 (citing Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co., 470 F. Supp. 699, 700 (M.D. La.
1979)).
3. 457 U.S. at 677.
4. Id. at 678 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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standing congressional signals concerning the underpinnings and extent
of admiralty jurisdiction. The net result is continued confusion and irra-
tionality in the area of admiralty tort jurisdiction, a result compelled nei-
ther by the case itself nor by the tools with which the Court might have
worked.
This article will examine the two decisional approaches that the
Richardson Court considered in support of the proposition that admiralty
jurisdiction should not apply to the facts of the case before it, and will
explore the shortcomings of each in an attempt to understand why the
majority ultimately felt compelled to reject both. 5 The article will then
focus on the five specific arguments thought to mandate that rejection,
demonstrating that the conclusion the Court reached is not logically sup-
portable. 6 Finally, a new approach to the issue will be forwarded, one that
provides the basis for a more rational approach to the broad issue of admi-
ralty tort jurisdiction. 7
II. THE COURT'S DECISIONAL DILEMMA
The Richardson Court found itself presented with two alternative deci-
sional approaches which could have led to a finding that admiralty juris-
diction does not apply to a case involving the collision of two vessels used
exclusively for pleasure. The first of these alternatives may be described
as a historical precedential approach, the second as a factual approach. 8
Each places a heavy emphasis on the commercial underpinnings of fed-
eral admiralty jurisdiction. Neither of these suggested approaches, how-
ever, provides a pragmatic scheme for defining admiralty tort jurisdiction
in the context of a given set of facts. The Court, while explicitly acknowl-
edging the commercial basis for federal jurisdiction in maritime matters,
felt constrained to opt for a simple solution which would bring certainty
to jurisdictional determinations. Yet, the unsatisfying result completely
removes vessel usage from consideration as a factor in jurisdictional de-
terminations.
A. The Historical Approach
Many commentators have suggested that the historical origins of admi-
ralty jurisdiction do not accord with the exercise of that jurisdiction over
5. See infra Parts IIA & iB.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See457 U.S. at 672-74.
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pleasure vessels. 9 The thrust of this historical argument, eloquently ex-
pressed in the Richardson dissent, is that admiralty jurisdiction is com-
mercially based. 10 This commercial nexus gives rise to a federal interest.
Absent the nexus, the federal interest disappears, and, the argument goes,
the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction becomes an inappropriate invasion
into matters reserved to the states. I
The proponents of the historical approach cite to a line of cases,' 2 most
decided in the last century, to demonstrate a consistent judicial recogni-
tion of the commercial basis of admiralty jurisdiction. The Richardson
majority acknowledged the historical background' 3 by stating that water-
borne commerce is the interest which justifies federal involvement in
maritime affairs, but then went on to assert that something as tenuous as a
"potential disruptive impact" constitutes a sufficient basis for that in-
volvement. 14
The majority's refusal to accept early cases as the final word on the
federal interest giving rise to admiralty jurisidiction is quite reasonable.
The fact that early cases reflect a definite commercial tone does not com-
pel the conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction must be restricted purely to
matters arising from maritime commerce. Rather, these cases are more
likely the result of the nonexistence of significant recreational boating ac-
tivity at the time the cases were decided. 15 The cases, then, neither sup-
port nor deny a federal interest in noncommercial watercraft.
The Richardson majority, in fact, insisted that such a federal interest
does exist, in the form of concern for uniform conduct on our water-
ways. 16 The analysis of the majority is superficially valid. If the protec-
tion of maritime commerce gives rise to a federal interest in pleasure craft
collisions, and if that interest can be vindicated only by application of
admiralty jurisdiction, then the application of that jurisdiction is justi-
fied. 17 The Court, apparently daunted by the grave difficulties it saw in
9. See, e.g., 7A J. MooRE & A. PELAEz, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACniCE, .325[5] (2d ed. 1982);
Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259, 280 (1950); Stolz,
Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 661, 666 (1963); Swaim, Yes, Vir-
ginia, There is an Admiralty: The Rodrigue Case, 16 Loy. L. REv. 43, 45 (1969-70); Note, Admi-
ralty Jurisdiction and the FMLA: The Maritime Lien on Houseboats, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 641, 642
(1980).
10. 457 U.S. at 679-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 685-86; Stolz, supra note 9, at 663.
12. See generally cases discussed in Stolz, supra note 9, at 675-88.
13. 457 U.S. at 673-74.
14. Id. at 675.
15. See Stolz, supra note 9, at 661.
16. 457 U.S. at 675.
17. A conclusion that maritime commerce can be protected only by invoking federal admiralty
jurisdiction is especially questionable in light of the Court's decision in Wilbum Boat Co. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955), discussed infra at note 76.
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defining "commercialness" for the benefit of the lower courts, saw no
means of protecting maritime commerce short of encompassing pleasure
vessel collisions within admiralty jurisdiction. This article will demon-
strate, however, that such federal interest as exists in collisions of plea-
sure craft need not be vindicated in admiralty jurisdiction, and that the
Richardson decision is therefore incorrect.
B. The Factual Approach
In Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 18 the Court opened
the door to a case-by-case analysis of the admiralty jurisdiction issue. 19
Departing from the traditional "locality" test, which attached admiralty
jurisdiction to virtually any tort occurring on a navigable waterway, 20 the
Court announced, without fully defining, the "traditional maritime ac-
tivity" test. 2'
Executive Jet left to the lower courts the task of determining what con-
stitutes a traditional maritime activity, with the apparent hope that this
rather vague concept would provide sufficient guidance for evolutionary
refinement and clarification of the tort jurisdiction issue. Under Executive
Jet, it is clear that the crash of a domestic commercial flight into navig-
able waters shortly after takeoff from an airport is not a traditional mari-
time activity. 22 This is all that is clear under Executive Jet. Among the
remaining questions is whether any waterborne activities involving vessel
navigation are excluded from admiralty jurisdiction. This question is the
essence of Richardson.
The Richardson case confronted the Court with the factual quagmire to
which Executive Jet can lead. Thus, the Richardson Court grappled with
issues as extreme as the applicability of admiralty jurisdiction to a pirogue
used by a small boy to harvest crawfish. 23 As will be discussed below, the
Court saw that the possible permutations of factual settings are infinite,
and that subsequent case law refinement of the Executive Jet guideline
could prove problematic. Coping with these permutations would require
the lower courts either to make a completely ad hoc decision in each case,
or to resort to the historical approach to determine what constitutes tradi-
tional maritime activity. Ad hoc decisionmaking, however, has little to
18. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
19. See generallv Note. The Other Half of Executive Jet: The New Rationality in Admiralty Juris-
diction. 57 TtEx L. REv 977 (1979) (describing case as beginning of movement toward a single
factual test for all admiralty jurisdiction issues).
20. Id. at 977.
21. 409 U.S. at 268.
22. Id.at261.
23. 457 U.S. at 684 (Powell. J., dissenting, citingTr. of Oral Arg. at 24).
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recommend it. The historical approach, as outlined above, is equally use-
less because it requires that some commercial flavor be present before
admiralty jurisdiction attaches, without providing useful guidelines as to
the extent of that flavor. As a result, the factual approach ends in a vicious
circle. The Court attempted to avoid this vicious circle by adopting a
new, all-inclusive "potential impact" approach to the issue of admiralty
tort jurisdiction. This "potential impact" approach, in turn, allowed the
Court to maintain that its overbroad formulation of admiralty jurisdiction
is fully supported by solicitude for maritime commercial activities.
C. Summary
The Court's apparent dilemma was that neither of the approaches out-
lined above appears to provide a workable method for deciding future
cases under new factual settings. The historical approach begs the ques-
tion of the extent of the federal interest in maritime affairs. Under the
factual approach, on the other hand, courts would either engage in ad hoc
decisionmaking, vAhich would result in chaotic confusion, or would be
led back to the historical approach. The Court was not willing to condone
the potential chaos of ad hoc decisionmaking, or to permit the lower
courts to rely on the historical approach to determine the boundaries of
the federal interest. Consequently, the Court provided instead what it ap-
parently considered to be a definitive statement of the extent of that inter-
est. 24 The Court thus declined to extend the logic of Executive Jet beyond
its facts. 25 In failing to clarify the amorphous concept of traditional mari-
time activity, the Court reversed the evolutionary trend foreshadowed by
Executive Jet,26 and, for lack of a more effective way to focus on the
federal interest in waterborne commerce, espoused the simplistic rule that
collisions of any watercraft on legally navigable waterways are the proper
subject of admiralty jurisdiction. 27 The Court thus changed the Executive
Jet locality plus traditional maritime activity test to a test of locality plus
navigation.
This article will demonstrate that it was not necessary'for the Court to
reach this undesirable result in order to avoid the decisional dilemma with
which it was concerned.
24.- 457 U.S. at 674-77.
25. Id.
26. See generally Note, supra note 19.
27. 457 U.S. at 677.
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III. THE COURT'S ARGUMENTS
The Richardson Court, ostensibly recognizing that the primary focus of
admiralty jurisdiction is the protection of maritime commerce,2 8 saw only
two possible avenues for fostering that protection: extending admiralty
jurisdiction to all vessel collisions on navigable waterways, or determin-
ing cases by relying on one of the two error-prone approaches discussed
above. The Court opted for the former, 29 and justified its choice with a
number of arguments. First, admiralty jurisdiction is necessary to ensure
the application of uniform rules of conduct on the nation's waterways. 30
Second, collisions of any watercraft potentially disrupt commerce. 31
Third, limiting admiralty jurisdiction to commercial vessels creates diffi-
cult fact determinations. 32 Fourth, noncommercial vessel owners under
such a scheme would be uncertain as to their duties and obligations. 33
Finally, attaching admiralty jurisdiction to pleasure vessel collisions is
consistent with federal statutes. 34
A. Uniform Rules of Conduct
The Court's first premise is a perceived need for uniform rules to gov-
ern conduct on navigable waterways. 35 The Court reached the untenable
conclusion that uniform rules of conduct require uniform admiralty juris-
diction. 36 Justice Powell, in his Richardson dissent, ably demonstrated
the fallacy of this reasoning. 37 "Congress has provided some rules gov-
erning water traffic, just as it has done for some land traffic. See 23
U.S.C. § 154 (55 m.p.h. speed limit). Yet no one suggests that federal
jurisdiction is needed to prevent chaos in automobile traffic, or that only
federal courts are qualified to try accident cases." 38
Examples of nationally uniform conduct not thought to require federal
court jurisdiction abound. All automobiles in this country drive on the
right-hand side of the road; the federal courts do not enforce this practice.
28. ld. at 674.
29. Id. at 677.
30. Id. at 675.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 675-76.
33. Id. at 676.
34. Id. at 676-77.
35. Id.at675.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 682 (Powell. J.. dissenting).
38. Id.
Vol. 59:1, 1983
Admiralty Jurisdiction
All states require motorists to observe reduced speeds in school zones; the
federal courts do not enforce this. 39
The lack of a need for simplistic uniformity in admiralty matters is also
revealed by the fact that not all federal enactments concerning vessel
safety and conduct apply to all vessels. The requirement for federal in-
spection of vessels is an example. The enactment setting forth require-
ments for vessel inspection is limited in applicability according to vessel
employment, propulsion, size, locus of operation, or some combination
thereof.40 The inspection requirements generally do not apply to pleasure
craft, other than those measuring 300 gross tons or over4' or those pro-
pelled by steam and measuring over forty feet in length. 42 The require-
ment that vessels coming into United States waters from foreign ports
make entry with the United States Customs Service does not apply to
pleasure craft owned by United States citizens. 43 In short, the federal in-
terest in watercraft and in conduct on the waterways does not extend to all
vessels for all purposes. In particular, it extends to pleasure craft for juris-
dictional purposes only when necessary to foster the federal interest in
uniform conduct on the waterways. The Richardson opinion fails to dem-
onstrate such a necessity.
The essential weakness in the Court's position is that it does not recog-
nize the supremacy of federal law when applicable and the obligation and
ability of state courts to apply that law. 44 'Justice Powell again ably dis-
cussed this point: "The Court does not suggest that state courts lack com-
petency to apply federal . . . law to this type of water traffic. And this
Court stands ready, if necessary, to review state decisions to ensure that
important issues of federal law are resolved correctly. "45
A need for uniform rules of conduct on the waterways simply does not
mandate the conclusion that federal jurisdiction must apply to all vessels
subject to those rules. 46
39. 46 U.S.C. § 8501 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 211 (1976)) represents a compel-
ling example of congressional deference to the states in a matter affecting waterway safety. That
legislation adopts as federal law state enactments regulating the conduct of vessel pilots.
40. 46 U.S.C. § 3301 (Aug. 26, 1983) (requiring inspection often classes of vessels); the classes
are defined in 46 U.S.C. § 2101 (Aug. 26, 1983). Former inspection requirements appeared in widely
scattered portions of title 46. See. e.g., 46 U.S.C. §§ 367, 390a, 395, 404, 405 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
41. 46 U.S.C. § 3301(7) (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 367 (Supp. V 1981)).
42. 46 U.S.C. § 3301(9) (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 404 (Supp. V 1981)).
43. 19 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
44. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; 102 S. Ct. at 2662 (Powell, J., dissenting); Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955) (dictum) ("And States can no more override
[admiralty] judicial rules validly fashioned than they can override Acts of Congress.").
45. 457 U.S. at 682 (Powell, J., dissenting).
46. The Court admitted as much in Executive Jet. There, proponents of admiralty jurisdiction
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B. Disruption of Maritime Commerce
The second reason forwarded by the Court is that a vessel catastrophe
occurring on a navigable waterway is of federal concern because of its
potential to disrupt commerce. 47 The federal interest generated by this
potential is reflected in a number of federal activities. Search and rescue
missions on navigable waters, for example, are conducted by a federal
agency, the United States Coast Guard. 48 Major marine casualties are in-
vestigated by that same agency. 49 The existence of these federal activities
does not mean, however, that federal court jurisdiction over waterway
catastrophes is always necessary.
In this regard, the Court is hoist on its own precedent. As Justice Pow-
ell astutely observed in his dissenting opinion, 50 what can be more disrup-
tive to commerce than the crash of a commercial airliner, or, more signifi-
cantly, a crash such as that of Air Florida Flight 90, which disrupted
airborne, waterborne, and highway traffic? 5 1 Yet Executive Jet explicitly
disavows admiralty jurisdiction over such events. 52
In short, the Court's concern with disruption of maritime commerce
ignores the factual setting of its own precedent, and, again, does not sup-
port a conclusion that admiralty jurisdiction is necessary in the case of
pleasure vessel collisions. The argument fails to recognize that there is a
common sense point at which potential disruption of maritime commerce
is so speculative as to render application of admiralty jurisdiction "ab-
surd." 53 The Court's apparent inability to analogize facts of prior cases to
its present argument is symptomatic of the next concern which the Court
expressed.
argued that aviation tort cases should be governed by uniform substantive and procedural laws; there-
fore. such actions should be heard in the federal courts. 409 U.S. at 273. The Court responded:
[Flor this Court to uphold federal admiralty jurisdiction . . . would be a most quixotic way of
approaching that goal. If federal uniformity is the desired goal with respect to claims arising
from aviation accidents, Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation appli-
cable to all such accidents, whether occurring on land or water, and adapted to the specific
characteristics of air commerce.
Id. at 273-74.
47. 457 U.S. at 675.
48. 14 U.S.C. § 88(1976).
49. 46 U.S.C. § 6301 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1976)).
50. 457 U.S. at 682-83 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51. Id.:seealsoid. at683n.7.
52. 409 U.S. at 261.
53. 457 U.S. at 678 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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C. Factual Difficulties
A concern with difficult fact determinations 54 probably represents the
key to the Court's refusal to adopt what it termed the "strict commercial
rule." 55 Here the majority adverted to grave difficulties leading to incon-
sistent findings or denials of admiralty jurisdiction, depending on the fac-
tors weighed by a given court in a particular case. 56 According to the
majority's understanding of the commercial rule, "fortuitous circum-
stances" would come into play, making it virtually impossible for any
judicial body to make reasoned distinctions between vessels on the basis
of usage. 57 These circumstances could relate to the prior usage of the ves-
sel, considering, for example, whether it had ever been rented or used for
commercial fishing. 58
The underlying problem here is that counsel for the petitioner failed to
provide the Court with a cogent test for determining when the requisite
"commercialness" exists in order for admiralty jurisdiction to attach.
The test proposed by the petitioner consisted of a two-tiered sliding-scale
inquiry. 59 The first tier involves an examination of the locale to determine
the type and amount of commercial traffic present. 60 If such activity is
prevalent on the waters where the mishap occurred, little or no inquiry
would be made as to whether the conduct of the parties had a commercial
flavor. 61 If the waters where the mishap occurred are not noted for carry-
ing commercial traffic, the second tier of the test would come into play,
inquiring into the conduct of the parties to determine whether their ac-
tivity was sufficiently commercial to support the assertion of admiralty
jurisdiction. 62 Needless to say, the interplay between these two factors
supports a potentially infinite number of variations. This proposed test
would be an attorney's delight, but the majority apparently found this
sliding-scale approach so complex that it would be conducive to outra-
geously inconsistent results. 63 For that reason, the Court declined to
adopt it, refusing "to inject the uncertainty inherent in such line-drawing
into maritime transportation." 64
54. Id. at 675-76.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Brief of Petitioners at 18, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
60. Id.
61. See id. at 18-20.
62. Id. at 18.
63. 457 U.S. at 675-76.
64. Id. at 676.
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D. Uncertainty of Vessel Operators
The fourth argument advanced by the majority, best characterized as a
makeweight, cites the potential uncertainty of noncommercial vessel op-
erators concerning their duties and liabilities while traversing navigable
waters flowing through more than one state. 65 The Court, agreeing with
the court of appeals, glibly observed that "[a]dopting the strict commer-
cial rule would frustrate the goal of promoting the smooth flow of mari-
time commerce" 66 because noncommercial navigators traversing navig-
able waters flowing through more than one state would be subject to
varying laws " 'depending upon their precise location within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of one state or another.' "67 The logic of asserting that
this potential adverse effect on noncommercial vessel operators will dis-
rupt maritime commerce is questionable. Further, the argument is casuis-
tic. The duties to which the majority referred are no more than the respon-
sibility to observe uniform rules of conduct on navigable waterways,
already shown to be enforceable without resort to admiralty jurisdiction.
The liabilities, on the other hand, have only the most tenuous relationship
to the ongoing flow of maritime commerce. Rather, they relate to sub-
stantive legal rules such as comparative negligence, 68 to be applied dur-
ing litigation following a mishap.
The dissenters objected to this spurious reasoning as an affront to fed-
eralism, contending that this was the major issue of the case. 69 The basis
of their complaint is that "expansions of federal admiralty jurisdiction are
accompanied by application of substantive-and pre-empting-federal
admiralty law." 70 The dissenters felt that this preemption of state legisla-
tive activity blocks experimentation by various localities, thus undercut-
ting one of the chief strengths of the federal system. 7 1 Under this view,
the net effect of asserting admiralty jurisdiction in matters of local con-
cern is to disenfranchise state legislatures by precluding them from deal-
ing with matters for which they are thought to be particularly well
suited. 72 This view, in sharp contrast to the approach taken by the major-
ity, is consistent with longstanding expressions of the Court's view of
federalism. 73
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting Richardson v. Foremost Ins. Co.. 641 F.2d 314.316 (5th Cir. 1981)).
68. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn. 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (contributory negligence in admiralty only
reduces recovery, whereas at common law it precludes recovery).
69. 457 U.S. at 685 (Powell. J.. dissenting).
70. Id. (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id.: see Stolz, supra note 9. at 664.
73. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc., v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
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The majority's argument on this point again fails to recognize the com-
petence and obligations of state courts. These courts routinely handle
conflict-of-law issues involving large commercial carriers such as air-
planes, 74 as well as noncommercial vehicles such as private automo-
biles. 75 Yet no one would suggest that the needs of commerce compel a
removal of these cases from state jurisdiction, or that vehicle owners (and
their insurers) are unduly hindered by potential subjection to varying legal
regimes. 76 The due process clause 77 serves to ensure that party litigants
are accorded fair treatment, regardless of the legal regime to which they
are subject. 78 Providing this guarantee is the function of that clause, not
the function of admiralty jurisdiction. 79
E. Consistency with Federal Enactments
The Richardson majority buttressed its opinion by claiming that the
decision comports with federal enactments.80 The Court cited four statu-
The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of
controversies in their courts may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to
the judiciary sections of the Constitution. ... Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their
own jurisdiction to the precise limits which [a federal] statute has defined.
Id. at 272-73 (quoting Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971), in turn quoting
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)).
74. See, e.g.. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
75. See. e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
76. The Supreme Court has, in fact, specifically disclaimed any concern with supplying a uni-
form legal regime to vessel insurers. In Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955), the Court held that regulation of marine insurance is purely the province of state law. Id. at
321. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, questioned whether the majority opinion had the effect of sub-
jecting the insurer of the Queen Mary to the varying insurance laws of New York, Louisiana, and
Texas when, on a single voyage, the vessel travels from New York City to New Orleans and Galves-
ton. Id. at 323 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Frankfurter would have limited the holding to the facts
of the case, that is, insurance covering an undocumented vessel used in local waters. Id. at 322
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In fact, the Court's general treatment of jurisdictional issues arising out of contract disputes has
reflected a less than compelling interest in protection of maritime commerce through exercise of
admiralty jurisdiction. See, e.g., Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 563-64 (1954) (rules for
partition and sale of vessel established by state law); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S.
109, 121 (1924) (state law governs specific performance of arbitration agreement); Thames Towboat
Co. v. The Schooner Francis McDonald, 254 U.S. 242, 243 (1920) (contract for construction of
vessel not within admiralty jurisdiction).
77. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
78. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
79. The requirement to apply the proper law is also imposed on the federal courts by Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie requires federal courts to apply substantive state law to cases
implicating no strong federal interest.
80. 457 U.S. at 676.
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tory schemes as examples of congressional expression of federal interest,
and found its decision consistent with those statutes. 8 1
The first of these is a rule of construction established by Congress, de-
fining the term "vessel" to include "every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water." 82 The Court read this language as a congressio-
nal signal that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction extends to
all vessels for all purposes. 83
The Court's reliance on this statutory language is a result of circular
logic. The constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction does not mention
the word "vessel.' '84 Rather, it confers jurisdiction over "all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." 85 To conclude that this rule of con-
struction grants jurisdiction over all vessels, the Court must first conclude
that all vessels are encompassed within the term "maritime." The Court
reaches that conclusion because Congress has said that all waterborne
contrivances are vessels.
The Court's argument is further erroneous in that it reads a rule of con-
struction as a grant of jurisdiction. The Court thus assumes that a statute
which performs such pedestrian tasks as explaining that the word "he" is
not to be construed as gender-denotive, 86 and that the term "county" in-
cludes parish, borough, and other subdivisional equivalents, 87 at the same
time stands as a congressional declaration that the federal courts, under
article III of the Constitution, are to exercise jurisdiction over all colli-
sions occurring on navigable waterways.
The Court's second statutory reference was to federal "Rules of the
Road" which govern the flow and behavior of traffic on navigable water-
ways. 88 These same enactments formed the basis of the Court's argument
that federal jurisdiction is compelled by the need for uniform conduct. 89
The argument fails here as it did there. A federal interest in uniform con-
duct does not per se require federal enforcement. The Court's argument
on this point is no answer;90 rather, it misses the obvious: All courts, both
federal and state, must enforce federal navigation laws.
81. Id. at 676-77: 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659-60 (1982). The Court's discussion of the Motor Boat
Act of 1940 was deleted from the official U.S. Reports version of the opinion. See supra notes 91-95
and accompanying text.
82. 1 U.S.C. § 3 (1982).
83. 457 U.S. at 676.
84. See U.S. CONST art. III. § 2, cl. 1.
85. Id.
86. I U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
87. Id. § 2.
88. 457 U.S. at 676 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 2001-73 (Supp. V 1981)).
89. See supra Part liA.
90. 457 U.S. at 676 n.6.
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The Court's third and most inexplicable reference was to the Motor
Boat Act of 1940 ("MBA"). 91 The Court's statement that the safety and
operational standards of that Act apply to all vessels without regard to
their commercial or noncommercial nature 92 is in error. A 1971 amend-
ment to the MBA 93 explicitly excludes from the MBA's coverage
"boats" as defined in and subject to the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971
("FBSA"). 94 "Boat" as defined in the FBSA means "any vessel . . .
manufactured or used primarily for noncommercial use," 95 thus encom-
passing the very vessels involved in Richardson.
The Court's final statutory reference was to the Extension of Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act.96 The Act extends admiralty jurisdiction to tort claims
arising out of damage to shore structures caused by vessels. 97 The Court's
reliance on this statute to support its delineation of admiralty tort jurisdic-
tion is disingenuous at best.
The Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act was passed to eliminate
an inequity resulting from strict application of the locality test. 98 The
inequity is illustrated by the common occurrence of a ship colliding with
the movable span of a drawbridge, where both parties are at fault. The
ship can bring an action in personam in admiralty against the bridge
owner and recoup its damages. The damage to the bridge, on the other
hand, was not a maritime tort under the locality test. The bridge owner
was therefore relegated to state court for recoupment. There the bridge
91. 102 S. Ct. 2654, 2659 (1982) (citing 46 U.S.C. §§ 526-526u (1976 & Supp. V 1981),
recodified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. (Aug. 26, 1983)). The reference to the MBA appears in
the opinion as printed in the advance sheet of the Supreme Court Reporter. This reference, however,
was deleted without comment from the official U.S. Reports version of the opinion appearing in the
U.S. Reports advance sheet.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 2659-60.
93. Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-75, § 41(b), 85 Stat. 213, 228 (1971) (initially
codified at 46 U.S.C. § 526u (1976); now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 4101 (Aug. 26, 1983) in substan-
tially reworded form). The amendment does continue the applicability of §§ 12 and 18-19 of the
Motor Boat Act to pleasure vessels. Those sections are, however, irrelevant to the Court's argument.
Section 12 merely exempted a motorboat from any requirement to carry copies of the pilot rules. 46
U.S.C. § 526k (1976) (repealed in recodification of Aug. 26, 1983). Section 18 was repealed by Act
of Oct. 6, 1980, Pub. L. 96-378, § 11(d), 94 Stat. 1513, 1519 (1980). Section 19 reiterates that
vessels subject to inspection under 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 3301(10) (Aug.
26, 1983)) (vessels carrying hazardous cargo) and under46 U.S.C. § 367 (now codified at 46 U.S.C.
§ 3301(7) (Aug. 26, 1983)) (seagoing vessels of at least 300 gross tons propelled by internal combus-
tion engines) continue to be so subject. See supra notes 40-42.
94. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-89 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The provisions of the FBSA are now codi-
fied in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. (Aug. 26, 1983).
95. 46 U.S.C. § 1452(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (recodified at 46 U.S.C. § 2101(25) (Aug. 26,
1983) with substantially different wording).
96. 457 U.S. at 676-77 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1976)).
97. 46U.S.C. §740(1976).
98. See N. HEALY & D. SHARPE. ADMIRALTY 153-54 (2d ed. 1974).
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owner risked being barred from suit because of contributory negligence. 99
The Act did not, as the Court implies, extend admiralty jurisdiction to all
vessels, but merely put the owners of shoreside facilities on an equal foot-
ing with the owners of vessels which damage those facilities.
F. Summary
A summary analysis of the arguments used by the majority in support
of its extension of admiralty jurisdiction in the Richardson case reveals
that only the third argument has logical merit. The first argument, citing
the need for uniform rules to govern conduct on navigable waters, results
in a non sequitur; the need for uniform rules does not require admiralty
jurisdiction to ensure their uniform enforcement. The second, which fo-
cuses on the potential disruption of maritime commerce, is contrary to the
Court's own precedent in Executive Jet. The fourth argument, that non-
commercial vessel owners would be uncertain as to their duties and liabil-
ities, is not, as the majority asserts, logically related to the "ongoing flow
of commerce." It also denigrates the ability of state courts to make con-
flict-of-law analyses; such analyses are routinely made in cases involving
the interstate travel of both commercial and noncommercial carriers. The
fifth argument, that a finding of admiralty jurisdiction on the facts of the
Richardson case is consistent with federal enactments in maritime mat-
ters, does not withstand close scrutiny because the majority's analysis of
those statutes overstates the significance of the expressions of federal in-
terest which they contain.
Because these arguments are not effective, the third argument, that any
attempt to restrict admiralty jurisdiction strictly on the basis of commer-
cial activity leads to difficult factual determinations, represents the grava-
men of the Court's opinion. Further, it is the only one of the five argu-
ments which is logically supportable. The underlying difficulty of
characterizing the "commercialness" of a vessel's activity reduces itself
to a problem in judicial line-drawing. The majority did not adopt the strict
"commercial rule" because it saw an examination of a vessel's activity
on a given day as the only means available for drawing such lines. As will
be demonstrated below, this view is too limited.
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL
In analyzing the travails of the Richardson Court in searching for a
rational means of delimiting the extent of admiralty jurisdiction, one be-
99. Id.
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gins to suspect that the manner in which the parties defined the issue of
the case may have had a great deal to do with the seemingly insurmount-
able problems which confronted the Court. The issue was framed by the
proponent of the commercial rule in terms of "[w]hether the admiralty
jurisdiction of the Federal Court should be extended to accidents occur-
ring between purely recreational boats in which there is absolutely no
commercial or traditional maritime activity involved." 100 This phraseol-
ogy cast the question presented by the facts of the case in terms of previ-
ous conceptualizations. Had the issue in the case been refined slightly to
focus on the question of whether any federal enactment exists which re-
flects a congressional intent to preempt state activities with respect to ves-
sels and at the same time provides a mechanism for the line-drawing from
which the Court shied, the line-drawing problem cited by the majority
would have proven susceptible to a resolution. The problem is, in fact,
surmountable, without resort to the difficult fact determinations the Court
envisioned.
A. Criteria
Once the issue in Richardson is refined, three criteria emerge as critical
for the formulation of a viable solution. First, the approach should be
based upon and, ideally, coextensive with a clear statement of congres-
sional intent to preempt state activity. Second, it should avoid conflict
with and, if possible, build upon the concept of "traditional maritime
activity" to avoid unnecessary conflict with the precedent established by
the Court's decision in Executive Jet. Finally, it should avoid the
100. Brief of Petitioners at ii, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982).
A more telling point, not raised in either the briefs of counsel or in oral argument, is that the
attachment of admiralty jurisdiction may result in the disenfranchisement of at least one of the parties
by blocking that party's right to a jury trial. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, 374 U.S. 16, 20
(1963). This feature of admiralty law is derived from its early connection with the law merchant.
Where merely commercial interests are concerned, the swift resolution of disputes is paramount.
Before the unification of admiralty with the rest of federal civil jurisdiction, cases involving disputes
sounding in admiralty were tried to a separate "side" of the federal district courts under a separate
docketing system. The judges hearing these cases usually possessed some special expertise in admi-
ralty matters. Parties to this type of litigation were not interested in protracted litigation before a jury
with no special expertise so much as they were interested in the speedy resolution of their dispute so
that business could resume its normal course.
When noncommercial parties are involved, the interest in an expedited trial is subsumed to that of
obtaining a full and fair hearing conducted before a group of peers. As there is no ongoing business to
act as a spur for an expedient settlement, the focus of the parties shifts to a desire to obtain compensa-
tory and punitive damages to atone for personal wrongs suffered. The special expertise of a judge
attuned to the needs of the maritime industry becomes irrelevant under these circumstances, and it
follows that another of the reasons for maritime jurisdiction evaporates as well. The fact that this
issue was neither argued by the parties nor raised sua sponte by the Court represents an inexcusable
oversight which would almost certainly have placed the case in an entirely different light.
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shortcomings of the strict historical approach to admiralty tort jurisdiction
by providing a simple and logical method of prospectively deciding the
applicability of that jurisdiction in the context of concrete fact situations.
To the extent that any method devised meets these criteria, it is at once
credible, constructive, and utilitarian. A close examination of the federal
law relating to vessel documentation and licensing, the Vessel Documen-
tation Act, '01 reveals that such a method may be derived by relying on its
provisions.
B. The Vessel Documentation Act
The Vessel Documentation Act ("VDA" or "Act") was enacted in
1980102 as a simultaneous recodification of existing documentation law
and streamlining of the procedures for vessel documentation. 103 Because
the Act retains the purposes and objectives of vessel documentation and
related substantive policies,104 it represents a restatement of longstanding
congressional expressions of federal interest with respect to vessels. That
interest extends only to vessels owned by United States citizens and mea-
suring at least five net tons. 105 Documentation is, in fact, a system of
national vessel registration which establishes a special relationship be-
tween the vessel and the United States, as evidenced by the maritime flag
which the vessel is authorized to assert. 106 This relationship serves to
identify the vessels to which the United States will afford sovereign pro-
tection in international contexts, 1 07 and the vessels to which it will accord
preferential treatment in the area of domestic commerce. 108
Documentation is mandatory for vessels measuring five net tons or
101. 46 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-22 (Aug. 26. 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. §§ 65-65w (Supp. V
1981)1.
102. Pub. L. 96-594. 94 Stat. 3453 (1980) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 12.101-22 (Aug. 26,
1983)) (formerly codilied at46 U.S.C. §§65-65w(Supp. V 1981)).
103. H.R. REt, No 428. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG &
At) NEit s 7162, 7165. See generally Drzal & Camilla, Documentation of Vessels: The Fog Lifts. 13
J. MAR L. & Com 261 (1982) (discussing the procedural simplifications made possible by the pas-
sage of the Act).
104. H.R. REi No 428. supra note 103, at 4. reprinted in 1980 U.S. CoDE CONG & AD NEWS
7162. 7165.
105. 46 U.S.C. § 12.102 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 65b (Supp. V 198 1)).
A vessel ton. in the context of the documentation laws, is not a measure of weight but of capacity.
100 cubic feet equaling one ton. The term is derived from the old English word "tun" meaning a
barrel with an approximate capacity of 252 gallons. For a detailed discussion of tonnage calculations
for documentation purposes, see 46 C.F.R. pt. 69 (1982).
106. See intra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
107. See 47 Fed. Reg. 27,490.27.490 (1982).
108. See i.
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more which engage in the coastwise trade 109 or the American fisheries. 110
Documentation is available, but not mandatory, for vessels meeting this
size requirement which are owned by United States citizens and which
engage only in pleasure travel, commercial activities not constituting
coastwise trade or fishing, or foreign trade. "'1 Vessels excluded from fed-
eral documentation include vessels measuring less than five net tons, and
vessels not operated on the navigable waters of the United States,1 12 al-
though vessels falling in the latter category may be documented as long as
they measure at least five net tons and are wholly owned by United States
citizens. 113 Non-self-propelled vessels qualified to engage in the coast-
wise trade are exempt from documentation when used in that trade within
harbors, in whole or in part on rivers or inland lakes, or on the internal
waterways or canals of any state. 114
C. The Proposed Nexus
As noted above, the Vessel Documentation Act is quite specific with
respect to the vessels to which it does not apply, those to which it applies
mandatorily, and those to which it applies permissively. Because of this
specificity, a jurisdictional system which closely parallels the provisions
of the Act would resolve the Court's perceived difficulty in defining
"commercialness" by overcoming the line-drawing problems that
prompted the Richardson decision.
Applying the VDA, maritime tort jurisdiction would arise in the fol-
lowing cases: (a) vessel casualties involving at least one vessel which is
109. 46 U.S.C. §§ 12,106-07 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. §§ 65i-65j (Supp. V
1981)).
The term "coastwise trade" is generally defined as the transportation of passengers and/or mer-
chandise between points in the United States. See 19 C.F.R. § 4.80 (1982); see also Gillentine v.
McKeand, 426 F.2d 717, 720-21 (1st Cir. 1970). As used in this article, the term coastwise trade
includes Great Lakes trade. The inclusion is not precisely accurate. Great Lakes trade encompasses
both domestic trade and foreign trade with Canada; coastwise trade encompasses only domestic trade.
Drzal & Camilla, supra note 103, at 263 n. 16. The term coastwise trade is interpreted here to include
Great Lakes trade because the citizenship and construction qualifications for each are the same. Id.
110. 46 U.S.C. § 12,108 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C § 65k (Supp. V 1981)). The term
"fishing" is defined as "the planting, cultivation, or taking of fish, shellfish, marine animals, pearls,
shells, or marine vegetation, or the transportation of any of those marine products to the United States
by the taking vessel or another vessel under the complete control and management of a common
owner or bareboat charterer." 19 C.F.R. § 4.96 (1982). The term includes the conduct of these
activities within the fishery conservation zone. 46 U.S.C. § 2101(11) (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46
U.S.C. § 65 (Supp. V 1981)).
111. 46 U.S.C. § 12,102 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 65b (Supp. V 1981)); 46
C.F.R. § 67.01-9 (1982).
112. 46C.F.R. §67.01-7(1982).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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documented under a commercial license; 1 5 (b) vessel casualties involv-
ing at least one foreign-flag vessel; and (c) vessel casualties involving an
undocumented vessel in which the proponent of admiralty jurisdiction
proves that an involved vessel was, at the time of the casualty, eligible for
documentation and engaged in an activity encompassed within a commer-
cial documentation license.
Certain consequences necessarily flow from such a scheme. Collisions
involving only vessels of under five net tons would be excluded from ad-
miralty tort jurisdiction. The Richardson vessels, and hence that colli-
sion, would fall within this exclusion, as would the pirogue with which
the Richardson majority was concerned. This exclusion would apply re-
gardless of whether the vessels had ever been used for commercial fishing
or any other activity which might colorably be described as commercial.
This result is desirable for several reasons. First, it leaves the states
with jurisdiction over watercraft which are registered by the states1 16
rather than the federal government and which, as a general proposition,
implicate no federal interest. Second, it brings manageable, logical, and
easily discernible boundaries to admiralty jurisdiction. Third, it excludes
small-scale commercial activity in which purely local concerns outweigh
any federal interest for lack of any substantial interstate or international
implications. Fourth, it agrees with the reasonable expectations of the
owners of small or noncommercial vessels. These owners would no doubt
be as surprised as were the Richardson defendants to learn that the recrea-
tional activities of their boats could subject them to admiralty jurisdiction.
115. A vessel's documentation consists of a Certificate of Documentation which may be vari-
ously endorsed to permit the vessel to engage in various employments or trades. Id. § 67.17-1. The
possible endorsements are: (1) registry, issued to vessels which engage in foreign trade; (2) coastwise
license, see supra note 109; (3) Great Lakes license, see supra note 109; (4) fishery license, see supra
note 110: and (5) pleasure license, issued to vessels used exclusively for pleasure. 46 C.F.R. subpt.
67.17 (1982). The term "commercial license" as used herein includes all these endorsements except
the pleasure license. While pleasure vessels of at least five net tons are eligible for documentation,
this fact is not germane to the Court's problem of defining the "commercialness" of vessels.
116. See Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, formerly 46 U.S.C. §§ 1451-89 (1976 & Supp. V
1981) (now codified in scattered sections of 46 U.S.C. (Aug. 26, 1983)). Under this Act, any vessel
which is undocumented and which is equipped with propulsion machinery of any type must have a
number issued by the proper issuing authority of the state in which the vessel is principally used. 46
U.S.C. § 12,301 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 1466 (1976)). A state is the proper issuing
authority if it institutes a numbering system which complies with regulations promulgated by the
Coast Guard and which is approved by that agency. 46 U.S.C. § 12,302(a)-(b) (Aug. 26, 1983)
(formerly 46 U.S.C. § 1467 (1976)). Absent a complying and approved system, the Coast Guard acts
as the issuing authority. 46 U.S.C. § 12,302(b) (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 1467 (1976)).
All but three of the states have established conforming systems. Significantly, the stated purpose of
the Federal Boat Safety Act was to provide a financial incentive for the states to become more in-
volved in boating regulations, especially in safety areas. S. REP. No. 248, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG & AD- NEws 1333, 1334.
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And finally, it eliminates the troublesome factual distinctions which so
concerned the Court. 117
The second obvious exclusion is for casualties involving only vessels
exceeding five net tons which are either registered with a state,1 18 or
which possess Certificates of Documentation bearing only pleasure li-
cense endorsements. 119 Again, this is a desirable exclusion. The Richard-
son Court itself conceded that the underpinnings of admiralty jurisdicion
are commercial in nature. 120 The Court brought the Richardson recrea-
tional craft into that jurisdiction, not because of a belief that pleasure
craft, per se, belong there, but because it saw no other way to protect the
commercial interests which are admiralty's special province. This pro-
posal, then, would permit the Court to foster the federal interest in com-
mercial water traffic without reaching the extreme and overly simplistic
results of Richardson.
Certain automatic inclusions also become obvious. Any casualty in-
volving a vessel that possesses a Certificate of Documentation bearing a
commercial license endorsement' 2' would be the subject of admiralty ju-
risdiction. This accords with the result sought by the Richardson Court:
protection of maritime commerce by use of admiralty jurisdiction. Again,
the proposal eliminates troublesome line-drawing; commercial documen-
tation would establish an irrebuttable presumption that the vessel is suffi-
ciently commercial to merit the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction. No
further judicial inquiry would be required.
Another automatic inclusion, arising from other sources of law, is for
casualties involving foreign-flag vessels. For reasons of international law
and comity, 122 such casualties are litigated in a federal forum. The inclu-
sion, though not derived from the VDA, achieves the same result: the
elimination of needless factual inquiry and judicial line-drawing.
117. In addition to eliminating the line-drawing problems the majority cites with respect to reli-
ance on actual vessel usage as the determining factor in the application of the "commercial rule," the
proposal also eliminates the need to make a jurisdictional finding that the incident occurred on navig-
able waters before federal admiralty jurisdiction can attach. This result logically follows because the
proposal more sharply focuses upon the real basis for the federal interest in particular vessel casual-
ties. Thus, the majority's speculation as to what impact the collision of the Richardson vessels would
have had on maritime commerce had the collision occurred on the St. Lawrence Seaway, 457 U.S. at
675, would be unnecessary in attempting to validate the assertion of admiralty jurisdiction, because
lack of federal interest in the vessels is a foregone conclusion once the current proposal is adopted.
118. See supra note 116.
119. See supra note 115.
120. 457 U.S. at 674.
121. See supra note 115.
122. See generally N. Singh, Maritime Flag and International Law 49-53 (1978) (discussing
specific incidents of sovereignty which mandate national rather than state involvement in multina-
tional conflicts) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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Still another automatic inclusion is for casualties which involve a com-
mercial vessel and a noncommercial vessel. In this instance, a further
balancing of federal and state interests is necessary. While a given state
undoubtedly holds a stronger interest in the noncommercial vessel than
does the federal government, the federal interest in the commercial ves-
sel, that is, in maritime commerce, must be regarded as paramount be-
cause of an actual impact on maritime commerce. Unlike the Richardson
majority's reliance on a speculative, potential impact on maritime com-
merce (an impact found to be too tenuous in Executive Jet), this result is
dictated by concrete fact.
Finally, the proposal brings into admiralty jurisdiction casualties in
which the proponent of admiralty jurisdiction proves (1) that an involved
vessel meets the eligibility criteria of the VDA for documentation (includ-
ing the size requirement), and (2) the existence, at the time of the casu-
alty, of activity analogous to that which would be encompassed within
federal commercial documentation. This aspect of the proposal results in
potential inclusion of commercial vessels which measure five net tons or
more but which are exempt from the documentation requirement. 123 Ad-
mittedly, the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in this context will require
some judicial factfinding; the extent of that factfinding is, however, far
more limited than that envisioned by the Richardson Court. Again ex-
cluded by the proposal are vessels of less than five net tons. Included are
only those vessels of requisite size which were demonstrably "commer-
cial" at the time of the incident under litigation.1 24 Thus the proposal
agrees with the Court's recognition of the commercial underpinnings of
admiralty jurisdiction.
D. Credibility
The Vessel Documentation Act serves as a more credible basis than the
statutes cited by the majority for systematically determining the vessels
which do, and do not, fall within federal admiralty jurisdiction. The Act
constitutes a clear expression of congressional interest in the vessels fall-
ing within its scope. 125
123. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
124. As a practical matter. most of these vessels will be documented, notwithstanding their ex-
emption. Vessels used in foreign trade will be documented to acquire the privileges and protections of
nationality. See supra text accompanying note 106: infra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
These same vessels, as well as other exempt vessels, may be documented to secure financing: most
lenders will insist on security based on the terms of the Ship Mortgage Act. See infra notes 143-50
and accompanying text.
125. H.R. REt' No 428. 96th Cong.. 2d Sess. 8-11 (1980). reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG
& At) NEws 7162.7168.
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While the specific objective of the Act was to "revise and improve"
the laws related to the documentation of vessels, 126 its heritage reflects a
consistent congressional concern with certain vessels and vessel activities
spanning nearly two hundred years. 127 The depth of that concern may be
measured by examining the policy uses which have been made of vessel
documentation, as well as the legal and other consequences which flow
from it.
Perhaps the main policy use made of documentation is that of cabotage:
the reservation of domestic waterborne commerce to vessels built in the
United States and owned by United States citizens. The cabotage princi-
ple is retained in the Vessel Documentation Act under which vessels em-
ployed in the coastwise trade or the American fisheries must meet the
documentation criteria. 128 Similarly, provisions of the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act 29 key to vessel documentation and afford to
documented vessels privileged access to the resources of the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Zone. 130
In the context of domestic commercial activity, the existence of a fed-
eral system of registration and licensing serves to preempt state number-
ing and licensing schemes so that a vessel operated under a federal license
(for example, a Certificate of Documentation endorsed with a coastwise
license) is ensured access to state waters for various commercial activi-
ties. 13 1 Indeed, the documentation statutes which preceded the Vessel
Documentation Act were a direct manifestation of congressional dissatis-
faction with state-created impediments to commerce which existed during
the earliest years of the republic. 132
Another primary purpose of vessel documentation is to establish the
126. H.R. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7162, 7162.
127. Drzal & Camilla, supra note 103, at 261.
The United States Coast Guard is the agency charged with administration of the vessel documenta-
tion program. The agency employs 138 individuals at 15 field offices and one headquarters office to
perform the documentation function. The program costs the Coast Guard approximately $5,844,000
annually. Letter from Phyllis D. Camilla to Steve Dickinson (August 8, 1983) (copy on file with the
Washington Law Review).
128. 46 U.S.C. §§ 12,102, 12,106, 12,108 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. §§ 65b, 65i,
65k (Supp. V 1981)); 46 C.F.R. subpt. 67.03 & § 67.17-5(b)(I), -9(b)(1) (1982).
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
130. Id. § 1802(27).
131. Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1977) (federal license to engage
in the mackerel fishery implies not only grant of right to navigate in state waters but also authority to
carry on fishery there in same manner as state residents); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
93-95 (1824) (federal license to engage in coasting trade not only establishes nationality of vessel but
also authority to carry and land passengers in given state).
132. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 46 Fed. Reg. 56,318, 56,335 (proposed Nov. 16, 1981).
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vessel's nationality for international purposes. 133 Vessel registration is
imbued with considerable international legal significance. 134 Documenta-
tion confers the privileges, protection, and immunities contemplated by
longstanding international law and custom. International law views na-
tional registration of vessels as the administrative procedure which im-
parts national character to a vessel 135 and establishes the right to assert the
maritime flag of a given country.136 Vessel registration, at least in the
context of merchant shipping tonnage, is considered the function and re-
sponsibility of the sovereign. 137 Proper registration and flagging are es-
sential to the orderly conduct of international commerce. The flag as-
serted by a vessel is an identifying mark which aids in preserving law on
the high seas. 1 38 The flag is also considered an aid in fixing responsibility
133. 46 U.S.C. § 12,104 (Aug. 26, 1983) (formerly 46 U.S.C. § 65g (Supp. V 1981)).
134. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82; see generally McDougal, Burke & Vlasic, Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the
Nationality of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25 (1960).
135. The Mohawk, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 566, 571 (1866) ("The purpose of a register is to declare
the nationality of a vessel ... and to enable her to assert that nationality wherever found.") The 1958
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 134. Article 5 of the Convention specifically requires that
each state establish an administrative procedure for the grant of nationality to its vessels:
I. Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registra-
tion of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State
whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the
ship: in particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administra-
tive, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
2. Each State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its flag documents to
that effect.
Id. art. 5.
Article 6 of the Convention places restraints on the ability of a vessel to assert a flag:
I. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and . . . shall be subject to its exclusive
jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of
call, save in the case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry.
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them according to conveni-
ence, may not claim any of the nationalities in question with respect to any other State, and may
be assimilated to a ship without nationality.
Id. art. 6.
136. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 134, art. 5; see N. Singh, supra note 122, chs.
1-2.
Each State determines for itself what ships it will regard as its own, but it cannot, of course.
impinge upon the prior rights of other States. If a vessel already has a nationality, another State
is not free to impose its nationality upon it .... Beyond this, a State is free to encourage applica-
tion for its nationality by maintaining liberal rules. No matter how lenient or harsh its conditions
may be, once a State has denoted that these conditions have been met to its satisfaction through
the medium of an official document, the nationality is impressed upon the vessel.
R. RIENOW. THE TEST OF THE NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 218-19 (1937) (footnotes omit-
ted).
137. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 134, art. 5.
138. N. Singh, supra note 122, at I.
Admiralty Jurisdiction
in cases of maritime tort. 139 The registration of a vessel determines the
national laws, including crewing and inspection laws, to which it is sub-
ject, 140 the country responsible for its actions, 141 and how and where legal
rights may be enforced against it. 142
In addition to the results directly intended by the documentation laws,
Congress has elected to employ these same laws to define eligibility for
other federal benefits. Perhaps the most important example of these is the
Ship Mortgage Act of 1920.143 The Ship Mortgage Act performs two
functions with respect to documented vessels. First, it provides a mecha-
nism for establishing constructive notice of conveyances and encum-
brances affecting vessels.144 Second, it provides for federal recordation
and access to a federal judicial forum for enforcement of vessel mort-
gages. 145 These functions relate only to documented vessels. 146 Parties
seeking establishment of notice, recordation, or enforcement with respect
to other vessels must resort to a state forum. 147
139. Id.; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (law of flag is
starting point for choice-of-law analysis in maritime cases); Romero v. International Terminal Oper-
ating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959) (Jones Act not applicable to maritime tort involving foreign parties
on foreign vessel in United States port); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (flag outweighs
most other factors in choice-of-law analyses). But see Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306
(1970) (law of base of operations held to prevail over law of flag); Evangelinos v. Andreavapor Cia.
Nay., S.A., 291 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1961) (nominal registry not determinative of applicable law in
cases involving liability of owner to crew).
140. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 134, art. 10. Other areas of sovereign control
under this article include the use of signals, communications, prevention of collisions, labor condi-
tions, equipment, and seaworthiness.
141. Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Govemmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150 (Advisory Opinion of June 8) (flag and registration are decid-
ing factors in determining state responsibility for compliance with international conventions). See
Convention on the High Seas, supra note 134, arts. 12-13, for specific examples of state responsibil-
ity concerning requirements to render assistance at sea and prevention of transport of slaves on
flagged vessels.
142. N. Singh, supra note 122, at 30.
143. 46U.S.C. §§911-84(1976&Supp.V 1981).
144. Id. § 921.
145. Id. §§ 922, 95 1. The Coast Guard estimates that in calender year 1981 it recorded preferred
mortgages with a total face value of $27 billion. Letter from Phyllis D. Camilla to Steve Dickinson
(August 8, 1983) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
146. 46U.S.C.§§911,922(1976&Supp.V1981).
147. The Thomas Barium, 293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934) ("if the mortgage is not within the Act, there
can be no suit for foreclosure in the admiralty"); McCorkle v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 459
F.2d 243, 248 (4th Cir. 1972) (no jurisdiction in admiralty over disputes arising under U.C.C. pur-
chase money security interest in vessel; criticizing but declining to change rule); Richard Bertram &
Co. v. The Yacht, Wanda, 447 F.2d 966, 967 (5th Cir. 1971) (no admiralty jurisdiction over mort-
gages not within the Act); The Susana, 2 F.2d 410, 414 (4th Cir. 1924) (recordation under Act of
mortgage on undocumented vessel does not constitute constructive notice); Hirsch v. The San Pablo,
81 F. Supp. 292, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1948) (no admiralty jurisdiction over mortgage not within Act);
Commercial Banking Corp. v. One Approximately 30-Foot Motor Boat, 86 F. Supp. 618, 624
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The provisions of the Ship Mortgage Act have in turn been extended to
define the parameters of a federal benefit. Under the provisions of the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936,148 the Secretary of Commerce is autho-
rized to guarantee loans made for the purpose of financing vessel con-
struction, reconstruction, or reconditioning. 49 The guarantees are re-
stricted to loans to vessels which are or will be documented by the United
States Coast Guard. 150
Another manifestation of the unique relationship established between
the sovereign and the documented vessel is the restriction contained in the
Shipping Act of 1916.151 That restriction prohibits the sale, charter, mort-
gage, or other transfer of an interest in a documented vessel to a non-
citizen without the approval of the Secretary of Commerce. 152 This provi-
sion illustrates that along with the various benefits conferred directly by
or in conjunction with documentation come certain obligations designed
to ensure the continued viability of our merchant fleet.
Congress has also used documentation as a method for identifying ves-
sels to which special tax benefits will be accorded. Thus, for example, a
documented vessel is exempt from the payment of tonnage taxes upon
arrival in the United States. 53 Similarly, a vessel which is documented
and operated in the foreign or domestic commerce of the United States is
considered depreciable property for purposes of the Internal Revenue
Code. 154
The various provisions discussed above serve to illustrate a continuing
and well-defined federal interest in the vessels encompassed within the
documentation laws. That interest obviously does not extend to all ves-
sels. Congress' longstanding statements regarding the types of vessels to
be documented, and its reliance on those same characterizations to define
other federal benefits and obligations, demonstrate that the vessel docu-
mentation laws represent an appropriate framework for delineating the
parameters of admiralty jurisdiction.
(D.N.J. 1948) (same); Brock v. Angeron, 16 So. 2d 93, 96 (La. Ct. App. 1943) (state vested with
jurisdiction over mortgage not within the Act).
18. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1294 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For a detailed discussion of financing
under this enactment, see Cook, Government Assistance in Financing: Title XI Federal Guarantee.
47 TuL L. REv 653(1973).
149. See 46 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
150. See id. § 1271(b); Cook, supra note 148, at 669.
151. 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
152. Id. § 808 (Supp. V 1981).
153. Id. § 122(1976).
154. 1.R.C. § 48 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Richardson Court set forth five arguments in support of its deci-
sion, four of which were not directly counter to the Court's own pre-
cedent in Executive Jet. The criteria for admiralty jurisdiction proposed
above amply address those four concerns to the extent that the concerns
are valid.
The first concern was with uniform conduct on our waterways. The
proposal directly answers this concern. By the very act of documenting a
vessel, the owner consents to the application of the law of the United
States.155 "This proposition has seemed so self-evident that it appears
never to have been questioned."' 156 That law, of course, includes those
federal statutes and regulations which govern conduct on the nation's wa-
terways.
The Court's next concern was with difficult fact determinations. As
discussed, the proposal removes the need for factual determinations by
establishing a conclusive presumption of "commercialness" in all but a
handful of cases.
A further concern was with the uncertainty of noncommercial vessel
owners as to the legal regime to which they may be subject. Here the
majority was not concerned so much with the question of whether state or
federal law would apply to a given casualty involving pleasure vessels,
but rather with the question of which state's law would apply as a plea-
sure vessel moves through waters under various state jurisdictions. As
analyzed above, this argument is a makeweight that is not really related to
the majority's ostensible rationale of protecting the ongoing flow of com-
merce. Another observation which might be made at this juncture is that,
absent an inappropriate exercise of federal jurisdiction, this situation is no
different from that which confronts motorists as they drive their vehicles
through varying state jurisdictions. State courts deal with such issues on a
routine and recurring basis in the context of choice-of-law determina-
tions. The proposal recognizes this reality and, rather than attempting to
pursue what may fairly be characterized as a red herring, treats the own-
ers of pleasure vessels no differently on the water than they are treated on
land. In short, under the proposal, owners of vessels are treated no differ-
ently than any other tortfeasors, who select neither their victims nor the
situs of their negligence. The Court's spurious concerns notwithstanding,
there is no federal reason for them to be treated differently.
The argument focusing on consistency with federal enactments is much
155. G. GILMoRE & C. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-64, at 477 (2d ed. 1975).
156. Id.
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better served by the proposal's linkage with the Vessel Documentation
Act for all of the reasons given in the discussion of credibility.
The remaining concern, that of potential impact on waterborne com-
merce, points out the sharp contrast between Richardson and the Court's
own holding in Executive Jet. Executive Jet, by its use of the traditional
maritime activity test, held out the promise that the Court was departing
from a rigid and often irrational application of the strict locality rule.
While Richardson does not return to a strict locality test, it nonetheless
trivializes the traditional maritime activity test by its sweeping conclusion
that any navigation is a "traditional maritime activity". Based on that
conclusion, it distinguished a commercial airliner from a pleasure boat.
That distinction is neither factually nor logically supportable from the
standpoint of ability to disrupt maritime commerce. Yet the Court, having
eschewed jurisdiction over the aircraft, encompassed the pleasure boat in
admiralty jurisdiction. This result is in itself distressing.
More significantly, the Richardson decision could well lead the Court
back to the "slippery slope" it struggled so hard to avoid. If potential
disruption of maritime commerce is to be the touchstone of federal admi-
ralty jurisdiction, how will the lower courts distinguish among a water
skier, a zip sledder, a swimmer, a small boat, an ocean liner, or a non-
commercial aircraft in determining when admiralty jurisdiction applies?
The critical issue of admiralty jurisdiction requires a more rational foun-
dation than that provided by Richardson. The proposal set forth in this
article should provide that foundation.
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